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ABSTRACT
This paper traces the fragility of the subject in the period extending 
from the aftermath of the Sexenio through to the early twentieth 
century. In particular, two case studies are focused upon: the 
question of gender “deviance” and the figure of the genius, in order 
to understand how medicine participated in the construction of 
“outsider” identities within the context of the emerging liberal 
order. How did liberal rationales exclude or curtail certain wayward 
expressions of identity and subjectivity? What consequences did 
the marking of “excessive” figures or outsiders have for notions of 
inclusiveness and citizenship within the late-nineteenth-century 
liberal order? By concentrating primarily on medical texts and journals 
published during the period, this study builds on existing research to 
tease out answers to these questions.
Introduction
The fragility of the political, social, and economic project of liberalism in Spain in the nine-
teenth century has been analysed extensively from a variety of perspectives. The nature of 
the Cortes de Cádiz, the construction of the nation, the process of economic transformation, 
relations with the rest of Europe, battles between secularism and religion, and the interac-
tions between Spanish liberalism and postcolonial regimes in Latin America form some 
scenarios within which liberalism in the nineteenth century has been assessed (Álvarez Junco 
1996, 2001; Cabrera and Pro 2014; Cruz Romeo and Sierra 2014; Juliá 2004). The emphasis 
until relatively recently in scholarly accounts has been placed on two related questions. First, 
attention has been paid to the complex and troubled process of political, economic, and 
religious transformation from the ancien régime through to early attempts at parliamentary 
democracy. Second, the record of Spanish liberalism or the interpretation of liberalism by 
Spanish politicians has been assessed in comparison to other models of liberalism introduced 
in the rest of Europe.
The interpretation whereby liberalism in Spain was “regarded as a simple legacy of failure” 
that, in turn, could conveniently “be held accountable for the ‘failures’ of Spanish history,” 
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has given way to a more complex analysis that pinpoints the “multifaceted and inherently 
heterogeneous legacy of Spanish liberalism” (Burdiel and Cruz Romeo 1998, 65). Although 
the early liberal parliamentary system in operation between 1808 and 1843 was oligarchic 
and basically anti-democratic, constituting “a fundamentally centralist system of govern-
ment” (66) that resulted in the failure to construct a coherent nation, this tendency responded 
to just one expression of liberalism among many others available at the time. As Burdiel and 
Cruz Romeo have argued, the failure to neutralise vested interests and the consequent focus 
on localism and provincialism to the detriment of more ambitious middle-class social ide-
alism certainly “deprived the Spanish Liberal Revolution of one possible way forward” (80). 
But this did not imply the failure of the liberal project as a whole. The more exclusionary 
expression of liberalism attached to a centralising state that shared only limited common-
alities with the nineteenth-century political and social thought of “founding liberal” figures 
such as J.S. mill gave way to new initiatives in the 1840s and, more notably, in the 1860s and 
1870s. Despite the transitory and corrupted form of liberalism prevailing during the so-called 
turno pacífico of the Restoration period (1874–1923), with its uneven record on democrati-
sation and modernisation, the liberalism of this period set about constructing a nationalising 
project that sought to implement a new form of politics in order to consign the previous 
tumultuous decades firmly to the past.
Evaluating the interpretive directions taken recently by historians and others, Andrew 
Ginger (2010, 6) has suggested that many accounts have “turn[ed] away from concern with 
seeking an elusive, perhaps chimerical revolutionary ‘bourgeoisie’, and from teleological 
assumptions” about, for example, processes of economic development. “They look instead,” 
he notes, “to the significance of subtler reconfigurations of social and economic networks 
across and beyond Spain” (6). Such work has revised notions of economic development and 
dominant western European ideas of Spanish “backwardness” and has provided a more 
complex picture of nineteenth-century Spanish political culture (Cruz 1996; Ringrose 1996). 
We are left with “a new, more nuanced vision of what the spirit of the age, and for that matter 
liberalism, meant” (Ginger 2010, 6).
Although these developments should be acknowledged, it is still necessary to go beyond 
an analysis of what liberalism actually “meant” and beyond a focus on how the “language of 
liberalism” enabled liberalism to be “recreated, and readopted by ordinary people” (Burdiel 
and Cruz Romeo 1998, 73), important aims though these are. Far fewer studies have focused 
on what might be termed the micro dynamics of liberalism itself. of equal importance is an 
account of the kinds of people or subjects that were created by, or emerged in tandem with, 
the dynamics of liberalism. We need to explore how liberalism was felt and experienced in 
the flesh, the body, and the mind, in the population and institutions in the liberal century. 
An analysis of the desire of liberalism to produce an ordered, managed, and controlled 
society – objectives that were axiomatic to liberal political concerns – needs to be under-
taken. We need to focus, in a word, on subjectivities.
An analysis of subjectivity, created within and through power relations, be these political, 
economic, or social, brings us to the analysis of the functioning of the liberal project in respect 
of its mode of government or project of governance. Liberalism, as Barry Hindess has illus-
trated, is commonly understood as a political doctrine concerned with the maximisation of 
individual liberty and the defence of this liberty against the encroaching power of the state. 
But these two core elements of liberalism encapsulate, for Hindess, a “fundamental ambiguity 
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in the liberal project” (Hindess 1996, 66). It is worth quoting Hindess extensively in order to 
appreciate this point:
The invocation of figures that are regarded both as natural or historically given realities and 
as artefacts that may not be fully realized is a ubiquitous feature of political life: consider the 
status of the “nation” or the “people” in nationalist discourse or of the “working class” in marxist 
and many other socialisms. In the discourse of liberal politics in particular, the figure of a com-
munity of autonomous individuals appears on the one hand as given reality, serving to identify 
the character and the limits of legitimate government. on the other hand, it appears as yet to 
be realized positivity, serving to define the objective for a variety of governmental projects. 
(Hindess 1996, 66)
This “in-between” or “work-in-progress” aspect of liberalism casts a different light on its oper-
ation. For Hindess an understanding of liberalism takes on two important modifications. 
First, that “the sphere of individual liberty should be seen, not so much as reflecting the 
natural liberty of the individual, but rather as a governmental product” deriving from liberal 
modes of government (Hindess 1996, 65). Second, that “the form of life in question is centred 
on the regulative ideal of personal autonomy,” comprising personal independence, ration-
ality, and responsibility. Taken together, these two insights imply an analysis of liberalism as 
part of a specific type of rule, which Foucault has termed “governmentality.”
This mode of operation, governmentality, is more about a “rationality of rule” (Rose 1996, 
39), an analytics of government, than about the government itself and more about the “hows” 
of government than the government as a set of institutions or bodies. Governmentality can 
be summarised as follows:
[Governmentality] is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity 
of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks 
to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, 
for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects 
and outcomes. (Dean 2010, 18; italics in original)
This rationality, nikolas Rose argues, went beyond the ordering of persons and activities 
prevailing in the eighteenth century in order to engage in the discipline of the body and 
the mind whereby the subject would be the focus of “a kind of individualizing moral nor-
mativity” (Rose 1996, 40). A clear division was established between those who could exercise 
citizenship properly and those who were incapable of governing themselves (with the aid 
of liberal institutions) (Rose 1996, 45).
The emergence of different subjects, either as individuals “subjected” to disciplinary pro-
cesses or as individuals actively crafting their reality (or both), should not be seen as some-
thing automatic or a priori as part of liberalism, but instead as part of what Foucault called 
the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault 1982, 220–1).
In Foucault’s analysis, the individual body was not sovereign or unrestrained in society, 
floating free as the classical liberal conception would have it under idealised conditions, but 
was itself a creation of power.1 It was bound up in the very project of liberalism:
[T]he individual is not to be conceived of as a sort of elementary nucleus […] on which power 
comes to fasten […] In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, 
certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as 
individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-à-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime 
effects. (Foucault 1980, 98)
As Vázquez further explains: particular entities or subjectivities, such as the self, the 
population, the criminal personality, for example, “no deben ser consideradas como 
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realidades empíricas sino como artefactos técnicos fabricados en el trabajo de conducir de 
las conductas y en el interior de dispositivos históricamente circunscritos” (Vázquez García 
2005, 170).2 The existence of particular types of persons, with their own history (pathological, 
criminal, anti-social), their own motivations, and their own ability to form their own world, 
is as entities that emerge from the ambivalent processes at the heart of liberalism. These 
entities require constant management, forming an ever-present tension at the heart of 
European  modernity. Those figures “excessive” to the norms of liberalism were cast out as 
the ghosts of an ancestral past – often as degenerative expressions of an earlier humanity 
or as atavistic throw-backs to a blurry evolutionary past in the wake of new theories of 
evolution (Glick, Ruiz, and  Puig-Samper 1999; Huertas and Winston 1992; Plumed Domingo 
and Rey González 2002).
This process of governmentality was inherently fragile and identified an integral “dark” 
side which could only be managed by means of an internal dynamics of inclusion/exclusion, 
which in turn drew on the identification of desirable and non-desirable individuals and 
groups (Pick 1989). In Spain, it was this “doble orla de horror y atracción, […] de una profunda 
ambigüedad […]” that was to haunt the bourgeois sensibility (maristany 1973, 6). What, 
then, were the criteria for inclusion and exclusion in the liberal order? Who was deemed to 
be part of this project and who was left out or marginalised as deviant within the idealised 
horizons of the late nineteenth century? How successful was the process of creation of the 
“liberal subject,” the self-aware, more or less autonomous, responsibly acting figure? Rather 
than searching for full-fledged “liberals” as a response to these questions we need to prob-
lematise the delicate nature of the construction of the subject in light of the articulations of 
power relations during the “liberal century.”
In Spain, just as the category of the “worker” did not simply emerge as a product of indus-
trial capitalism and trade unionism, being fragmented along multiple lines according to 
gender, economic position, and notions of self-identity (De Felipe Redondo 2012), the liberal 
subject, both self-aware and active as a citizen, was perhaps not quite a fiction but was at 
best an idealised aspiration. Such a figure harboured not one set of national and class alle-
giances, one understanding of “race,” and one gender, supposedly accrued over time, but 
multiple synchronic identities and subjectivities that may have co-existed. A liberal political 
view could be combined at any one historical juncture with strong religious sentiments. 
Powerful working-class sectors could also advocate liberal understandings or could dissent 
from the liberal project, and “regional” nationalist sentiments could find themselves incor-
porated in or excluded from dominant liberal frameworks.3
In order to explore questions such as these, this article takes as its primary focus the 40 
years between 1870 and 1910 and explores a selection of categories of individual who were 
repelled by emerging scientific, legal, and political discourses as eccentric, dissident, incom-
patible with, or “excessive” to the liberal project but who at the same time were fascinating 
in their difference. Specifically, it focuses on the field of the sciences of the body and mind 
and, especially, on the medico-legal field in the last third of the nineteenth and the first 
decade of the twentieth century. While most existing literature on these fields has been 
written from within the paradigm of the history of these branches of science, here their 
relationship with liberal rationales in respect of the ordering of the subject forms the key 
question to be analysed (Campos marín 2007; Conseglieri and Villasante 2007; Huertas 2003; 
Plumed Domingo and Rey González 2002). Acknowledging that such an undertaking is 
extremely broad, here we focus on a limited number of case studies.
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The first substantive part of this article centres on the characteristics and context of the 
liberal order with respect to its variability, engagement with European models, and concerns 
about the threats to liberal Spain in terms of social dangerousness, crime, and those who 
were understood to constitute sexual “outlaws.”4 In order to set the scene, specific examples 
are drawn from liberal concepts of the differences between men and women in the late 
nineteenth century and from canonical texts of legal medicine which identified the new 
category of so-called “sexual inversion.” The second principal part of the article focuses on 
an analysis of changing medical discourse on the limits of legal responsibility in cases of 
madness. Were criminals capable of rational thought and, if so, why did they commit crimes? 
How were madmen incorporated into or marginalised from the liberal order? The limits of 
madness and the propensity for crime are analysed in an admittedly marginal figure within 
these discourses but one which we believe illustrates well the inclusion/exclusion dynamic: 
the figure of the genius. Rather than attempting to be exhaustive, this study aims to set out 
suggestions for the reinterpretation of the complexities, including the aspirations and fail-
ures, of the Spanish liberal project in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by 
focusing specifically on the creation of particular expressions of marginal subjectivity.
Subjectivity and science
The emergence of a new juridical and social order in Spain in the early nineteenth century 
broke with the past and placed emphasis on the corporations and collective interests that 
made up society but not on the individuals that composed that society.5 Because of this, 
the national project in which early Spanish liberalism was engaged operated on the collective 
rather than the individual level in respect of class, labour, and gender affiliations. The tumul-
tuous 1820s and 1830s, which saw a reversal of the liberal project, a fragmentation of the 
elites, and a difficult process of modernisation (muñoz Sempere and Alonso 2011), were 
accompanied by the rise of a number of contradictory configurations that Jo Labanyi (2004) 
has called “border subjectivities.” The fact that, for example, no hegemonic model of the 
nation existed in the 1830s led the country’s Romantics to revert to Arab Spain for inspiration, 
not as nostalgia but as an active proposition in order to ground their concept of the modern 
European subject characterised by cultural pluralism and ethnic diversity. By means of this 
contradictory positioning, courtly love in the texts Labanyi analysed is defined as being part 
of the inheritance of the Arabic occupation of the peninsula and a means by which Spain 
could be provided with a route towards the promised modernity of Europeanisation. This 
dynamic of “progress” and reversal was in turn founded on what mónica Burguera in her 
analysis of the 1830s has termed a plurality of liberalisms which admitted and constructed 
“diferentes versiones de lo social” (Burguera 2012, 378), as well as producing a proliferation 
of subjectivities of a different nature; “el carácter polisémico e histórico de algunas de las 
categorías básicas sobre las que se reelaboró ese orden liberal” (24).
Across European scientific circles from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, greater dis-
tinction was placed on the different component groups that made up society, on the 
make-up of individuals, and on their place in the broader world as the ties and paradigms 
remaining as hangovers from the ancien régime, where rank and heritage prevailed, were 
steadily eroded. This process of scientific change and internationalisation was particularly 
evident in the Spanish case over the years between 1860 and 1890 given the political and 
social changes begun by the Sexenio (1868). It was continued by the inauguration of the 
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First Republic (1873–4) and the ensuing Restoration of the monarchy (1874) (Sánchez Ron 
1999). It was accompanied by the realisation that society contained its own internal threats 
and weaknesses – from dissident groups to deviant individuals – and by a reinterpretation 
of the past that identified the fragility of liberal thought and practice in a changing world 
of economic competitiveness and potentially fast-moving political transformation.
The process of scientific change and internationalisation was also accompanied by a shift 
from the more collective and corporative expression of early Spanish liberalism towards a 
more individualised expression. In turn, greater store was placed on the individual as forger 
of history and new socio-political relations; not someone to whom things were merely done, 
but someone who moulded their own life under the auspices of political, social, and biolog-
ical responsibility. If the individual in the nineteenth century became an effect of power in 
the context of the construction of the sciences of the mind and the medico-legal profession’s 
interest in personal identity (Foucault 1980, 98), the individual was also brought into the 
limelight by a cluster of social concerns pinpointed by specialist bodies and political analysts. 
But this expanded individuality as active subjectivity was carefully calibrated. Inherent to 
the liberal politics of individuality was the juxtaposition, on the one hand, of demands for 
greater rights and, on the other, the acknowledgement of the danger of contamination by 
individuals and social groups previously unknown or rarely acknowledged (Vázquez García 
and moreno mengíbar 1997, 247–9). In Spain, anxieties over a perceived lack of virility and 
general national vigour had, according to some nationalist sectors, allowed Spain’s last col-
onies to disappear, as the country lunged into a deep crisis in and after 1898 (Harrison and 
Hoyle 2000). The growing contestation of women’s movements, an alleged crisis in the birth 
rate, the acknowledgement of the “social question,” and powerful, destabilising working-class 
movements, all placed emphasis on the need to seek out pathological and dissident strains 
in the national body (Cleminson and Vázquez García 2007, 175–215). The alcoholic, the homo-
sexual, the prostitute, and the criminal – the “‘illegals’ of nature” – posed a threat to this 
emerging liberal order, a threat that had to be contained and managed (Campos marín, 
martínez Pérez, and Huertas García-Alejo 2000). What is important to stress, however, is that 
these groups were seen as coming from “nature”; they were no longer contained by the 
religious categories of sin or moral turpitude. This “resignification” of nature and the partial 
secularisation of the world were integral to the scientific avanzada of the late nineteenth 
century.6 Deviance from prescribed models, whether gendered, sexual, or political (in par-
ticular anarchism and socialism, but also periphery nationalisms were designated “terato-
logical” or monstrous, another naturalised category) (Suárez Cortina 2000, 57), was articulated 
in medical and psychiatric terms in the context of the individual as the store of new subjec-
tivities and the fount of criminality, perversity, and immorality (Foucault 1992, 39).
In this way, the “savages within,” namely “anarchists and female delinquents and prosti-
tutes,” could be effectively controlled and neutralised (Labanyi 2000, 79).7 By dint of this act 
of prestidigitation, of the taming of nature and human passions, a “harmonious Spain” would 
be created (Capellán de miguel 2006). Particular interpretations of the work of Karl Krause 
(1781–1832) (the vehicle by which much liberal ideology was imported into Spain) (Díaz 
1973; López-morillas 1981) would result in a balance between faith and science (Capellán 
de miguel 2006, 183–4), a rejection of the “disharmonious” class struggle (189), a strong role 
for the state, and a rational self (191; 201–5). oscillating between idealism and positivism 
throughout the last four decades of the nineteenth century, Krausism, as expressed in the 
thought of Gumersindo de Azcárate, posited the category of the “social person,” 
JouRnAL oF IBERIAn AnD LATIn AmERICAn STuDIES  29
harmoniously integrated through the family, municipality, nation, and therefore humanity 
(53). Disorders in this equation could be amended by an individualised treatment of delin-
quents and repentance could restore rationality and therefore optimum behaviour; sociology 
and criminology, once medicalised by a framework that saw the delinquent as a savage 
descended from a primitive society that no longer existed but whose survivors posed a 
“social danger,” became the basis for explanations of degeneration that threatened the very 
core of the bourgeois project (Peset 1983; Huertas and Winston 1993). Positivist thought, 
based on demonstration and the identification of particular traits, both mental and physical, 
effectively “demanded that political, social and moral phenomena be converted into objec-
tive facts, which were secure in theory and manageable in practice” (Huertas and Winston 
1992, 402).
Rationalised gender differences
The conundrums of liberalism in Spain are clearly illustrated by questions relating to the 
supposed biological differences between the sexes. In Europe generally, eighteenth-century 
medicine articulated numerous differences between the sexes, in terms of the size, weight, 
and structure of the skeleton, the size and function of the brain, and the role to be played 
by both sexes in society and in reproduction. In the nineteenth century, in the context of 
the conflicting legacy of Enlightenment thought, these differences became more individu-
alised and took on an increasingly politicised dimension. Although liberalism sought to 
create equality in the legal and social spheres between the sexes and between different 
kinds of human being, the notion that “all people are by nature equal was met in conservative 
quarters with the search for natural differences” between them (Schiebinger 1994, 10). These 
“natural” differences, ascribed to women and “non-whites,” operated to exclude these groups 
as political subjects: “inclusion in the polis rested on notions of natural equalities, while 
exclusion from it rested on notions of natural differences” (Schiebinger 1994, 10).
In Spain, this construction of difference took a particular form (Aldaraca 1991; Jagoe 1994; 
Kirkpatrick 1989; Labanyi 2000). According to Bridget Aldaraca, for nineteenth-century liberal 
ideology in general and for the followers of Karl Krause in Spain in particular, there was a 
marked antagonism in the relation between the public and the domestic spheres whereby 
the family was seen as the basic cell of an organic whole, state, or nation. This conflict 
between the public and private and the harmonisation of the family within the context of 
a broader political and social project would be resolved by according women a specific 
civilising and domestic role within the Christian home (Aldaraca 1991, 66; cf. Di Febo 1976).8 
This role was not stable and uncontested throughout the nineteenth century. Different mod-
els of, for example, upper-class femininity were posited and lived out, notably in emerging 
intellectual associations and female tertulias especially from the 1830s onwards (Burguera 
2012, 12 and passim; Smith 2006). Despite these changes, notions of difference combined 
with the idea that women made the cornerstone of the family, society, and hence state 
became solidly embedded in the idea of the “ángel del hogar” (the angel of the hearth). 
Prevalent from 1850, this notion “canonized the woman who accepted her role in the private 
sphere” (Jagoe 1994, 15–16), thus allotting women “unprecedented spiritual authority” in 
that sphere based on essentialised sex differences (17). These distinctions were in turn con-
solidated by science as the arbiter of new proofs of ancient truths allowing the modern 
liberal state to be satisfactorily ordered in an appropriate hierarchical order (Suárez Cortina 
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2000, 26, 54–6; cf. Espigado Tocino 2010). Although very few would argue now that the 
public sphere was an inclusive space, it is not possible to view liberalism as an inherently 
masculinist realm. As Smith has shown, the peculiarities of the Spanish uptake of liberalism 
with its Krausist elements trouble both these interpretations (Smith 2006, 4–5).
That certain branches of scientific endeavour altered their focus between the 1850s and 
1870s is illustrated clearly in the shifts in language, epistemology, and legal frameworks that 
they underwent. Exemplary of these changes is the medico-legal treatise Tratado de Medicina 
y Cirugía Legal by Pedro mata, university of madrid Professor of Legal medicine. In the 1857 
edition of this work, mata discussed the legal aspects of criminality and various sexual crimes 
but within a framework that was essentially inherited from the old categories of the eight-
eenth or early nineteenth century, whereby sex crimes (abuse of minors, rape, sodomy, etc.) 
were considered as instances caused by faulty morality on the part of the perpetrator or as 
a result of an individual mental aberration. However, by the 1874 edition of this work, we 
see a new paradigm settle in (Cleminson 2004, 417–20). no longer were, for example, indi-
vidual “pederasts,” “prostitutes,” or “sodomites” referred to. Instead mata identified a whole 
class or type of person with specific characteristics, penchants, and desires as forming these 
groups as new “species.” In a word, mata was identifying new types of subjectivities. That 
these new subjectivities were, in some sense, the product of a particular medico-legal inter-
pretation only enhanced their status as borderline subjectivities – on the borderline between 
their own desires, self-awareness, and the new taxonomies of the expert field of legal 
medicine.
In turn, mata’s new schema represented the almost verbatim acceptance of the work of 
the French medico-legal expert Ambroise Tardieu of the medical Faculty of Paris who had 
published his Étude Médico-Légale sur les Attentats aux Moeurs in 1857. In this book, we see 
no longer the classifications of the old sexual regime but the languages of the new classifi-
cations and taxonomical interpretations. In this way, we can see how the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century supposed a move towards the “interiority” of the person and his/her 
sentiments, abilities, and strengths, in contrast to what prevailed under the ancien régime 
where it had been a question of the alliances that an individual would make with others, 
the rank occupied, a person’s membership of guilds, and the right to take the sacrament 
(Vázquez García and moreno mengíbar 1997, 203). In turn, such a shift was emblematic of 
what might be termed a transfer of sacrality from the external realm, where theological 
considerations played a significant role in behaviour, to the internal realm, which responded 
to “deep down” psychological and anatomical yearnings and traits (Campos 2012, 68–71). 
Despite this secularising shift, such discourse connected with renewed Catholic evaluations 
of the role of the individual in Western societies as envisaged in the encyclical Rerum Novarum 
(1880) and the rise of “social Catholicism” (Callaghan 2000).
The genius: eccentric, mad, or dangerous?
Although, as Rafael Huertas points out, the figure of the genius in Western culture dates 
back to the seventeenth century, “it was during the positivist era that society displayed the 
keenest interest in [the concept]” (301). Sociologists, anthropologists, physicians, and others 
“strove to show which ‘differentiating traits’ made it impossible to consider the human ‘genius’ 
within the limits of ‘normality’” of society at the time (Huertas 1993, 301). This tension 
between normality and abnormality and the ways in which this relationship operated within 
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the context of the late nineteenth century in Spain make the genius an illustrative figure 
worthy of study. Although admittedly a minor figure, the genius illustrates how the bound-
aries between desirable and undesirable persons were configured within the liberal period. 
The genius him- or, more unusually, herself (Peset 1999, 125), represented in turn a “border-
land” subjectivity of the kind Labanyi has identified.
The liminal qualities of the genius, positioned between acute perspicacity and madness, 
were examined most extensively first by the French physician L.F. Lélut in his Le Génie, la raison 
et la folie (first edition 1836) and other medical experts elaborated upon his premise with J.J. 
moreau de Tours in 1859 proposing the concept of the “génie-névrose” in his La Psychologie 
morbide (Huertas 1993, 304–5). For moreau, genius was a form of neurosis arising from the 
same causes as madness. In his Traité des maladies mentales (1860), morel, within a framework 
that discussed human illness (Peset 1999, 109), argued that genius resulted from a process of 
degeneration. This was by no means a unanimous position, however; max nordau, for example, 
argued that there was not necessarily an a priori connection between the two (nordau 1910, 
136).9 It was only two decades later that the paradigm of the potential “dangerousness” and 
degenerative qualities of the genius was eventually established by the criminologist Cesare 
Lombroso’s work on Genio e follia (1864), which became L’uomo di genio (1888), and the delicate 
boundaries between madness and genius continued to be interrogated into the twentieth 
century (Huertas 1993, 308).10 Specifically in Spain, these connections were explored in the 
1920s by the psychiatrist Gonzalo Rodríguez Lafora (1922, cited in Peset 1999, 166, n. 49).
Accompanying this interpretation was an evolutionary explanation that drew on Darwin 
and others, which posited social change in terms of survival, competition between different 
types, and the progress of the strongest over the weak (Peset 1999, 107). men were more 
prone to become geniuses than women who, in nordau’s understanding, conserved the 
primitive human type more than men. In men individual formation predominated as part 
of the primitive vital law (nordau 1910, 36). Francis Galton, cousin of Darwin, and founder 
of eugenics, aimed to establish that mental and physical ability were set by inheritance 
(Galton 1892). For him, the genius would be a wholesome example of the best in inheritance 
and ability. These two explanations of genius – as a derivative of pathology and as a result 
of the highest inherited qualities – would run in parallel rather than in opposition. They 
focused on different aetiologies and sets of evidence; degenerationist thought would “ocu-
parse con detalle de las taras orgánicas de los seres degenerados,” while the evolutionary 
understanding “procura analizar más los comportamientos (intelectivos o sociales)” (Peset 
1999, 107). The sharing of interpretations, nevertheless, resulted in two changes in the con-
sideration of mental dis/order. First, both perspectives sought to substitute mere descriptive 
accounts for quantitative, positivist analyses that allowed them to provide a solid basis for 
their theories. Second, in a social and biological sense, this allowed experts to elaborate 
“clasificaciones, que buscan dividir, marginar e incluso eliminar” those deemed undesirable 
or exceptional (108). Both dynamics responded to the ambivalences highlighted above and 
responded to the “calculating” rationales of liberalism as elaborated by nikolas Rose.
By 1895, the two French authors magnan and Legrain, in their Les dégénérés, considered 
the genius as a “superior degenerate” whose faculties had been over-developed. This resulted 
in certain anti-social traits and dysfunctions, such as a tendency towards excessive concen-
tration, an irregular lifestyle, a lack of altruism, a disinterest for family life (Peset 1999, 110), 
and a predilection for solitariness. The consequence was that the lineage would die out 
through a lack of reproductive possibilities: “las familias de genios se agotan pronto” (124). 
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This consideration placed the genius within the “unproductive” sectors of the population 
which did not conform to the “life-administering” power of “bio-political” exigencies of nine-
teenth-century regimes (Dean 2010, 128). The later book by Édouard Toulouse, Enquête 
médico-psychologique sur les rapports de la supériorité intellectuelle avec la néuropathie (1896), 
cemented the relation between genius and positivist science as part of a study so complete 
and wide-ranging as to be considered by Huertas to be operating ‘within a positivist ortho-
doxy difficult to better’ (Huertas 1993, 314; cf. Peset 1999, 107–13).
Late nineteenth-century European societies, then, were entranced by the fragility of the 
mind and the possible negative effects of an over-intellectual education. The borderlands 
between healthy curiosity and intellectual pursuit and obsession and madness became a 
motif for fin de siècle nations during an age when “risk,” both individual and social, was a 
defining category leading to the need to manage the disruptive in the context of a devel-
oping welfare state (Ewald 1986; Cabrera 2013, 11). Spain was no exception to this phenom-
enon. The borderlands between genius, madness, and criminality were also subject to intense 
enquiry and the responsibility of the individual in respect of crime became the focus of 
detailed debates, and divisions, between legal and psychiatric experts. In what follows, a 
series of articles from 1880 by the alienist José maría Esquerdo in an influential medical 
journal, the Revista de Medicina y Cirugía Prácticas, is analysed for its unusual and careful 
identification of the qualities of the “madman” (Esquerdo 1880a,1880b).11 The madman, 
seemingly a non-rational being in a world that was to be considered a harmonious expression 
of natural law guided by Catholic tenets, was a figure that disrupted this equilibrium. He 
therefore needed to be explained, excused, or set aside from “normal” society which 
accounted for every small (or major) deviation. Why would someone be mad? asked Esquerdo. 
Because the natural equilibrium had been disturbed. Why would someone commit a crime? 
Because they had momentarily or permanently lost their rationality. What was the role of 
science in a liberal society that respected the individual? Examination, classification, and, if 
necessary, reclusion, he argued.
Esquerdo’s series of articles on madmen is contrasted with a two-part article, 30 years 
later in the same review in 1910, on the subject of the genius by the Zaragoza doctor Antonio 
Gota. Within the proliferation of subjectivities in the years 1880–1910, the latter was identi-
fied by Gota as being dangerously close to the madman but still distinct and capable of 
providing a positive contribution to society. Although intimately connected to nine-
teenth-century psychiatry, the figure of the genius was permitted a “safe place” by Gota 
within the range of eccentric behaviours identified in the on-going taxonomical process of 
classification of the unusual (Gota 1910a, 1910b). The two sets of articles selected here are 
but a small part of the discourse produced on such topics over the period studied. But they 
are taken to be representative of the debate and are a useful yardstick given the fact that 
they appear in the same review, separated by 30 years.
Dr Esquerdo, a forgotten figure of nineteenth-century progressive psychiatry (López 
Piñero 2008), eliminated some of the highly coercive practices current in many mental asy-
lums at the time and was a fine example of liberal and republican culture, having been leader 
of the Partido Republicano Progresista from 1895 and one of a group of significant political 
figures who established the unión Republicana nacional in 1897. Famously arguing that the 
serial rapist and woman-killer Garayo el Sacamantecas should be reprieved because of his 
insanity (a condition, he argued, that only a trained medical expert could identify), Esquerdo 
pressed for the penal codes of the future to be written by doctors (Labanyi 2000, 75).
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The title of the two-part series by Esquerdo, the text of a speech given to the Ateneo de 
Internos de madrid, reaffirmed the value of the expert analysis of the ill subject, the peritaje. 
“madmen who do not appear to be so,” his title, instantly evokes the specialist vision capable 
of seeing beyond the apparent and reaching the real. Such an understanding was comple-
mented by an apparently paradoxical diagnosis: the aim of Esquerdo’s study was to redeem 
the madman from public opinion and to confirm his real and not illusory lack of responsibility 
(“su irresponsabilidad positiva, real, no ilusoria, ante los tribunales”) (Esquerdo 1880a, 353). 
Esquerdo noted that he had been working on this new doctrine since 1869 and it was based 
on results to be derived from observation (354); it was, as such, he argued a positivist endeav-
our coinciding with the new political circumstances inaugurated by the revolutionary move-
ments of 1868. The new doctrine, however, was not one that should remain in the clinic; it 
was to be disseminated in popular culture and utilised by the courts. It was the latter that 
would, in light of such theories, be able to distinguish between those who appeared to be 
sound of mind when in fact they were mad. A different kind of sentencing of these individuals 
would result: “Aquellos que se confunden con los cuerdos; procuremos ante todo limpiar de 
errores la opinion de muchos compañeros eminentes é ilustrados en otras materias, ¡que 
tambien en techos de regios alcázares hay telarañas!” (355). In typical nineteenth-century 
style a long list of illnesses were cited as examples of madmen who were confused with 
normal types: imbeciles, monomaniacs of different species, kleptomaniacs, dipsomaniacs, 
and others whom science had not yet labelled.
This classificatory zeal, exemplified by authors such as Von Krafft-Ebing in his Psychopathia 
Sexualis (1886), represented a further innovation in the techniques of diagnosis. Physical 
stigma or evidence of disease or madness were not necessarily either visible or indeed 
present in the patient. The expert’s task was precisely to see beyond the external and assess 
the interiority of the illness. one of these figures, the “imbecile,” “no tiene síntomas somáticos, 
síntomas físicos, perceptible á simple vista; no presentan, al exterior defectos de organ-
ización” (Esquerdo 1880a, 355). Indeed, the imbecile did not display any of “estos caractéres 
que señalan á primera vista la monstruosidad; se parecen completamente al cuerdo” (356). 
This figure, therefore, was easily contrasted with the “idiot” whose physical and mental attrib-
utes were clearly visible. The imbecile, moreover, could harbour “desarrollos privilegiados 
de facultades aisladas,” and there was no necessary correlation between intelligence and 
memory. The imbecile was, like other unusual figures such as dwarves and giants, a “dispro-
portionate” figure (“la desproporcion se hace notar desde luego”) and as such these types 
were on the edges of the natural order: “La naturaleza, cuando se va á los extremos, pierde 
el tipo, el órden, la regularidad” (359). But these individuals were not characterised in their 
totality by one extreme quality or the other. They harboured disproportion, extreme char-
acteristics, and rudimentary and excellent traits in the same person. Total imbecility was, 
therefore, a fiction (360).
Such insights had been converted into legal understandings of responsibility in criminal 
acts.12 The new 1870 Penal Code, Esquerdo pointed out, exonerated the madman, imbecile, 
and child from legal responsibility for their acts. Although it was conceded that the child 
possessed greater moral sense than the imbecile, a way of understanding the latter was to 
classify him as “un niño, con las pasiones violentas, potentes del hombre; brioso para acom-
eter, débil para convencer” (Esquerdo 1880a, 362). These were figures whose sense of reason 
was insufficiently developed or had been impaired by some factor.
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In the second part of his article, Esquerdo argued that sending the imbecile to a mental 
asylum and locking him up for good was an act of injustice. Rather than radically different 
from the normal person, the imbecile “viste como nosotros, con nosotros conversa en la 
mesa, en el paseo, en la tertulia, en el pensar, en el sentir, en el ejecutar, en todo se acomoda 
á la vida de la razon, si no herís la exigua esfera de su aberración” (Esquerdo 1880b, 427). He 
was, as such, recoverable for society and was not to be confused with everyday criminals. 
or rather, he should not be treated as such. Esquerdo’s address finished with a plea to the 
peritos assembled in the medical doctors’ Ateneo: when asked to give their judgements on 
these madmen who did not appear to be so, they should cover “su cuerpo con el augusto 
purpúreo manto de la irresponsabilidad” rather than handing them over to “la segur del 
verdugo” (432).
Esquerdo, in his advocacy of greater humanitarianism with respect to criminals and mad-
men, was faithful to the new developments emerging in the profession of phrenology and 
psychiatry. His reaffirmation of the doctor’s power to assess his patients was a move set to 
consolidate the role of the medical expert in the courts and hence the apparatus of the state. 
He was also faithful to a holistic concept of society and human beings as part of nature with 
its infinite variations in similarity to Krausist concepts of natural equilibrium. The imbecile, 
given his lack of external physical characteristics, his possible brilliance, but also his propen-
sity to commit savage acts, was cast as an almost invisible threat or as the “other” within; he 
was an “other” to be managed and classified (and ultimately neutralised) by a sophisticated 
medico-legal team. Harmony would thus be restored to society and to human existence.
Esquerdo acknowledged that nature produced variety and was careful to differentiate 
the imbecile from the idiot. This allowed him to introduce the figure of the genius. He was 
keen to acknowledge the extremes of nature and just as dwarves and giants represented 
the extremes in size, “los imbeciles y los genios son las estaturas extremas en el sentido 
mental” (Esquerdo 1880a, 359). Geniuses were not, as Lombroso had argued, immune from 
the travails of eccentricity or even madness or degeneration. The tinge of degeneration in 
the genius was widely acknowledged but this figure was seen as more benign than the 
imbecile or idiot. Even Lombroso had hinted at the presence of geniuses in Spanish history, 
referring to Cervantes, murillo, Velásquez, and Góngora, amongst others (Lombroso 1891, 
124).
The work by Dr Antonio Gota 30 years later is illustrative of this tendency to signal an 
extreme figure in society only to facilitate his rehabilitation or to assert the benign charac-
teristics of his “condition.” As we have seen in the work of Esquerdo, this followed a well 
marked out nineteenth-century tradition in the classification of eccentric figures. most were 
perceived as potential threats to the social order; some were consigned to places of punish-
ment and vigilance; others were brought back into the fold as productive individuals within 
a diverse social setting. This trend within liberalism would continue throughout the twentieth 
century; many of the figures identified by Krafft-Ebing, for example, would be “de-classified” 
as threats as the twentieth century wore on.
Like Esquerdo, Gota acknowledged that there were certain characteristics in the madman 
and the genius that “se parecen, se asemejan.” This was illusory, however, and the madman 
would never scale the spiritual heights of the genius; therefore, it was necessary to distinguish 
between the two and between the man of superior talents and the individual of mediocre 
intelligence (Gota 1910a, 129). Gota followed Esquerdo’s reasoning and even some of the 
same language employed to describe madmen. Geniuses possessed manias, phobias, lacked 
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equilibrium, possibly suffered from degeneration, and constituted sick, anomalous figures 
outside of the normal rules. nature was once more evoked in order to assist in the identifi-
cation of wayward individuals: “La naturaleza no prefiere las particularidades, las excepciones; 
no estima lo anormal, por el contrario, trata de hacerlo desaparecer y cuida y se interesa por 
la uniformidad de la raza” (131). nature – and for nature we may read the liberal order, 
entwined with notions of natural harmony as it was – attempted to put geniuses in their 
place: it was “esencialmente democrática, niveladora […] y hace entrar á los extraviados, á 
los seres excéntricos en el lugar que les corresponde” and was reactive to anyone “desequil-
ibrado” (131; original italics).
updating the analysis since Esquerdo, Lombroso, and Galton by referring to a wide range 
of new scientific research (Gota 1910b, 171–2), Gota confirmed the genius as potentially 
unbalanced, degenerate, and as harbouring monomanias. However, he also acknowledged 
that no-one was perfect: “El hombre perfecto, de irreprochable salud física y moral, el com-
pleto ó tipo ideal, según la anatomía y fisiología normales, realmente no existe” (179). In this 
way, the discordant eccentric is effectively rehabilitated as odd but normal and as a figure 
that possesses a higher social and/or biological function. Traces of this type could be found 
democratically dispersed in the wider social milieu. The genius amplifies the sensibility and 
conscience of whatever he touches or invents. He discovers a “verdad nueva” (180). Even 
though he wanders along the borders of madness, and is an exception, an anomaly, and a 
“cosa extraña,” the psychic activity of the madman is less developed than that of the normal 
man and the intelligence of the genius is above both. Instead of hoping, like Lombroso, that 
nature would preserve humanity from “being dazzled by the brilliancy of those men of genius 
who might well be compared […] to falling stars, lost and dispersed over the crust of the 
earth” (Lombroso 1891, 361), Gota welcomed the illumination of the world by geniuses as 
“fenómenos cósmicos ignorados” (Gota 1910b, 180).
Conclusion
Three principal conclusions can be derived from this study. First, a shift can be traced from 
the rather amorphous juridical and social understandings of “the social” in Spain arising from 
the early nineteenth-century constitutions, which placed emphasis on the corporations and 
collective interests that made up society but not on the individuals that composed that 
society, towards an increasing emphasis on the individual and, later, the active and respon-
sible subject of liberalism. Coinciding with the new political and scientific scenarios of the 
1870s, groups of individuals were identified as belonging to particular types (the worker, 
the invert, the genius) with specific characteristics. In this passage from an “anatomo-politics” 
that focused on the individual body, we see the analysis of types whereby the population 
“is not simply a collection of living human beings but a kind of living entity with a history 
and a development, and with possibilities of pathology” (Dean 2010, 127), a “species body” 
as Foucault has called it.
Second, the ambivalences at the heart of liberalism, whereby individual freedom was 
maximised in opposition to the state, grew larger as the Spanish liberal century progressed. 
This tendency, once again, became sharpened after the Sexenio and the political develop-
ments enshrined in the new constitution of 1868. Such changes, in tune with developments 
in science and increased traffic in knowledge across national borders, reinforced such a 
process. These ambivalences, rather than being antithetical to liberalism, were integral to 
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its politics and “conduct of conduct”; they were part of what mitchell Dean has called the 
“illiberality of liberalism” and this was, in addition to a commitment to freedom within Spanish 
liberalism, present from the 1870s onwards. Although liberal government appeals to the 
notion of the subject active in its own government and “presupposes certain types of free 
subject in the operation of particular programmes of conduct” (Dean 2010, 156), this “free 
subject” can never be free under liberalism. The illiberal aspect of liberalism is manifested 
in two ways. First, in “those practices and rationalities that will divide populations and exclude 
certain categories from the status of the autonomous and rational person” (Dean 2010, 156). 
The second is the way in which “the free subject of liberalism is divided against him or herself 
in so far as the condition of a mature and responsible use of freedom entails a domination 
of aspects of the self” (Dean 2010, 156).
Third, it is worth considering the relationship between processes of subjectification and 
the process whereby citizens are created. Foucault has argued that these two processes 
cannot be held as autonomous or separate and are best understood as steps towards the 
normalisation of individuals in accordance with disciplinary discourses and practices such 
as the school, hospital, work, and family. Despite their connections, nevertheless, for Foucault 
subjectification or the creation of subjects is a more positive development than making 
citizens, as it allows for a degree of individual agency not necessarily seen in processes 
leading to citizenship. Furthermore, the process of making citizens should not be viewed as 
being brought about by the mere drawing up of a new constitution. Assaulted by the mul-
tiple techniques of power in the nineteenth century, subjectivity in Spain became fraction-
alised in its various disciplinary settings and its reconstitution in the unity of the individual 
is made in accordance with the demands of disciplinary domination.
At the very least it will be recognised that the creation of citizens entailed the disciplining 
of individuals and their insertion in webs of productivity and control. As a corollary to the 
identification of “normal” political actors and practices, those deemed pathological were 
signalled as the “danger within” in a society that increasingly sought to neutralise risks 
(Cabrera 2013). The identification of dangerous groups and individuals as a threat to the 
liberal order was predicated on the classification of all individuals and especially those that 
did not coincide with established norms. The process of the individualisation of social dan-
gerousness was realised through a minute process of detailed observations, measurements, 
and assessments of individual malefactors and the identification of the group to which they 
belonged. Both the madman and the genius, although treated with compassion, were set 
at the margins of both nature and society within a holistic viewpoint that sought to identify 
individuals and ideas which were “disproportionate” to or unproductive in the new order. 
These individuals and groups disrupted the social and economic equilibrium of liberalism 
and undermined visions of a harmonious Spain. Rather than see the dichotomisation of 
public and private, reason and sentiment, and indeed male and female, as bound up with 
the “contradicciones fundacionales del propio liberalismo” (Burguera 2012, 179), it has been 
argued here that these complementary but subordinated categories were liberalism’s very 
founding possibility and were integral to its modus operandi.
Notes
1.  Elements of this section and the next two draw on aspects of Cleminson and Vázquez García 
(2011).
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2.  In this way, the individual is differentiated from the subject. The individual “se asocia con aquella 
forma de conciencia por la que nos autocomprendemos como seres únicos y singulares” and 
is focused primarily on individual affairs (Vázquez García 2005, 23). See also Julia Varela (2006).
3.  The example of the work of Jacques Rancière on the working-class movements of the 1830 
revolution in France is illustrative of this possibility. Rather than engaging in purely economic 
demands, as in the standard model of working-class identity formation, some sectors of the 
French working class rejected and revolted against capitalism’s desire to control every aspect 
of their lives, including leisure time. See Rancière (2012).
4.  While one expression of sexual transgression, homosexuality, was not illegal per se in Spain for 
most of the nineteenth century, this expression usefully denotes both the legal constraints on 
and social marginalisation of homosexuality during the period.
5.  See the contribution by Gregorio Alonso in this issue.
6.  In contrast to some other European countries at the time, e.g. Portugal where positivism 
dominated scientific milieus, significant sectors of the scientific elite in Spain still held on to 
profound religious beliefs. These were made to be compatible with new scientific discoveries, 
but often the juxtaposition was not a happy one. Perhaps this explains in part the noted 
eclecticism of Spanish science.
7.  Works by criminologists such as Ferri, Garofalo, and Lombroso were evidently important in 
this process, identifying criminality with a broader process of “degeneration” across European 
societies. See Cesare Lombroso, L’Uomo delinquente (1876) and Gli anarchici (1895).
8.  The different role of women in the construction of the home and the education they should 
receive is analysed extensively in Di Febo (1976). Di Febo illustrates how later liberal thinkers 
such as Giner de los Ríos and Adolfo González Posada never went beyond “the most advanced 
liberal reformism” (80) and refused to sanction the more radical positions taken by the workers’ 
movement on this subject (67–8).
9.  In addition, nordau argued that genius was not inherited, despite being extraordinary (146), 
there being a certain brain structure that allowed for the propensity (237–8), but that will was 
a more important factor: “Al lado del juicio, hemos dicho, la voluntad es la parte esencial del 
genio” (204).
10.  Lombroso (1891, 5) wrote in the chapter on genius and degeneration: “The paradox that 
confounds genius with neurosis, however cruel and sad it may seem, is found to be not devoid 
of solid foundation when examined from various points of view which have escaped even 
recent observers.” on Lombroso in Spain, see maristany (1973) and Labanyi (2000, 79). Peset 
(1999, 126) notes that Ernst Kretschmer and Karl Jaspers in the late 1910s and early 1920s 
analysed personality traits, individual pathologies, and looked for traits of genius in their 
studies. Kretschmer published his Geniale Menschen in 1929.
11.  Esquerdo was a doctor at the General Hospital of madrid and Director of the Carabanchel Alto 
mental asylum. A brief mention of this series of articles is made in Campos (2012, 151), where 
it is noted that they achieved “una importante repercusión mediática.”
12.  As Campos points out (2012, 131), Article 8, Point 1 of the 1870 Code established that “están 
exentos de responsabilidad el imbécil y el loco, a no ser que hayan obrado en un intervalo 
de razón.” of course, crucial in the legal process was the determination of whether in fact 
the individual had acted in a period of lucidity; hence the complex debates in cases such as 
morillo’s as analysed by Campos.
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